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Imago Dei en personas con discapacidad 
intelectual grave
Resumen: La mayor parte de la enseñanza 
eclesial y de la tradición teológica referente 
a la categoría de Imago Dei es entendida 
de forma que no se ajusta a la realidad de 
las personas con discapacidad intelectual. 
Se trata, por lo general, de los argumentos 
que confinan el ser imagen de Dios a 
una serie de capacidades especiales del 
intelecto del humano, o a la capacidad 
de dominar sobre el resto de la creación. 
El objetivo de este artículo es proponer 
una interpretación alternativa de Imago 
Dei que de ninguna forma sea excluyente 
respecto de las personas con discapacidad 
intelectual severa. El texto se basa en 
la interpretación de la relación de la 
imagen de Dios, manteniendo la tradición 
que la une con la libertad y el dominio sobre 
la creación. Se muestra a las personas con 
discapacidad intelectual severa como sujetos 
que activamente hacen uso de la libertad y 
del dominio del mundo, pero de manera 
única, de acuerdo con su condición.
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Abstract: The bulk of the Church’s teaching 
and theological tradition concerning Imago Dei 
appears to interpret the concept in a way that is 
hardly compatible with the reality of people with 
intellectual disabilities at best. This particularly 
concerns the themes in theological tradition 
defining God’s image as special intellectual faculties 
common to human beings and/or their capacity 
for exercising dominance over the rest of creation. 
This article offers an interpretation of Imago 
Dei that is in no way oppressive for people with 
profound intellectual disabilities. It is inspired by 
the relational interpretation of God’s image, whilst 
being also firmly rooted in the tradition linking it 
to aspects such as freedom and dominance over the 
rest of creation. It shows individuals with profound 
intellectual disability as subjects actively exercising 
freedom and partaking in dominance over the rest 
of creation, yet in a way unique to them and their 
condition. 
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Introduction
Discussing the doctrine of imago Dei in the context of intellectual disability, partic-
ularly profound intellectual disability, may seem like a daunting endeavor. The bulk 
of the Church’s teaching and theological tradition concerning imago Dei appears to 
interpret the concept in a way that is hardly compatible with the reality of people with 
intellectual disabilities at best. This particularly concerns the themes in theological 
tradition defining God’s image as special intellectual faculties common to human 
beings and/or their capacity for exercising dominance over the rest of creation.1
Some theologians of disability—having identified the traditional interpretations 
regarding the concept of God’s image in the human being that are oppressive towards 
people with disabilities (not exclusively intellectual)—have called for the doctrine of 
God’s image to be replaced with e.g. the category of Christ’s body as the cornerstone 
of theological anthropology.2 Others—faced with so many imago Dei interpretations 
seemingly oppressive for people with disabilities—have settled for the mere claim that 
God’s image escapes definition, and since those with disabilities are human, they have 
God’s image in them, in no way affected by their disability. Still others, pursuing this 
line of reasoning, have offered very vague interpretations of the concept.3
All these strategies, however, raise inevitable doubts. First, it seems both im-
possible and undesirable for theological anthropology to no longer be concerned with 
the idea of God’s image in the human person. Imago Dei is a biblical notion, later 
developed in the tradition of the Church. Even though over the centuries it has had 
interpretations that are poorly aligned with the core of the Christian faith, whilst 
1 See Glyn, “Pied Beauty: The Theological Anthropology of Impairment and Disability in Recent Catholic 
Theology in the Light of Vatican II.” As multiple studies trace the history of how the concept of imago 
Dei has been interpreted throughout the theological tradition and teaching of the Church, it is not the 
aim of this paper.
2 Hull, “The Broken Body in a Broken World: A Contribution to a Christian Doctrine of Person from 
a Disabled Point of View,” 5-23. 
3 Hedges-Goettl, “Thinking Theologically About Inclusion,” 16. As Hedges-Goettl puts it, “if persons 
with disabilities are human, therefore, they are (as are we all) undeprivably and inescapably in God’s 
image.” The author goes on to state that the mere fact of having been created amounts to being an image 
of God (ibid., 21), a fairly controversial claim considering that not only humans are “created”, but so is 
the entire visible world, which, nonetheless, is not in its entirety referred to as imago Dei. Further on, 
Hedges-Goettl refines her interpretation of imago Dei, describing it as the ability to enter into relations 
(with others and with God), and having a unique relationship with God that other creatures do not have 
(ibid., 21). A vague understanding of God’s image is also offered by Reynolds, who construes imago Dei 
as a unique relationship human beings have with God, the world, and with one another. The human 
person is a unique creature, but what does that precisely mean? According to Reynolds, Genesis does not 
clarify (Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion: A Theology of Disability and Hospitality, 177).
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being more philosophical in nature, it is impossible, in my view, to simply abandon 
it and “move on”. 
The concept clearly warrants an in-depth analysis instead of merely being 
disposed of, since (as I venture to demonstrate in this text), it does not need to be 
considered oppressive towards either people with disabilities, or any other human 
person whatsoever. Abandoning it, on the other hand, would amount neglecting one 
of the most crucial biblical traditions concerning the human being, one which, in my 
view, deserves to continue to be perceived as central to any theological anthropology.
Second, it is worth appreciating the fact stressed by some theologians that the 
idea of imago Dei is impossible to accurately and clearly define. God is a mystery, 
hence the same applies to the human being as his/her image.4 It must be remembered, 
nonetheless, that God is not solely mysterious, someone transcending the human 
mind and experience, and thus beyond human’s grasp, someone entirely different 
from the created world. For at the same time, God is someone who allows him/
herself to be known (by revealing him/herself to us), someone we can venture certain 
statements about. Thus, also the human being, as his/her image, may be to a certain 
extent described, defined, and each human person, being imago Dei that they are, 
reveals something about God.
This article, therefore, is aimed at offering an interpretation of imago Dei that 
is in no way oppressive for people with profound intellectual disabilities, nor for 
any other human person. I will also seek to answer whether people with intellectual 
disabilities reflect God’s image in any way unique to them. Thus, I will attempt 
to point out such qualities present in people with profound intellectual disabilities 
that render them a very unique image of God.5
4 Swinton, “Who is the God We Worship? Theologies of Disability; Challenges and New Possibilities,” 303. 
5 Imago Dei is perceived here as the essence of humanity, common to all people without exceptions, 
as the very thing that sets them radically apart from the rest of the material world. God’s image is also 
understood as that, which by being particular to a given person (or group of people) reveals God’s mystery 
in its own, conspicuous way. These characteristic qualities may also, nonetheless, be found in other visible 
creatures. In the case of other beings, theology most commonly refers to the qualities in which God is 
naturally manifested as “traces of God” (in Latin, vestigia Dei, vestigia trinitatis), whilst applying the term 
imago Dei exclusively to the human person. Furthermore, this text adopts, in a sense, the traditional 
distinction originally made by Irenaeus of Lyons between two biblical notions, the “image” and the 
“likeness” of God. Irenaeus understood God’s image as something indelible/immutable, whereas the 
likeness as something that can be dimmed (and which has, in fact, been dimmed as a result of sin), but 
also regained through the salvation Christ offered to us, and even advanced in the process of becoming 
more like God. Even though this distinction will not be literally followed in this article, since there are no 
exegetical grounds for it (see Bayer, “Being in the Image of God,” 79.), I would like to account for both 
these aspects in the understanding of imago Dei, interpreting God’s image both as growing in likeness 
to God, a person’s voluntary pursuit of becoming more like God (Irenaeus’ “likeness”—the dynamic 
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Imago Dei—Significance for  
Theological Anthropology 
As I have pointed out, theological anthropology should not part with the concept of 
imago Dei as key for the understanding of the human being in the light of Christian 
faith. First and foremost, the idea is profoundly a biblical one, and as such deserves 
special attention and consideration. Second, even though previously hardly attributed 
with greater significance in the theological tradition,6 the Second Vatican Council 
in its pastoral constitution on the Church in the World, Gaudium et Spes (1965, 
hereinafter referred to as GS) recognized the concept of God’s image and likeness as 
central for anthropology (GS 12), thus opening new avenues for the refection on this 
biblical notion.7
In the light of theological argument, it must be pointed out that the signifi-
cance of the concept of imago Dei lies in the fact that the reflection on the human 
being starts with “above”, with our likeness to God. Thus, it operates on an opposite 
principle than numerous philosophical reflections on the human being, where we are 
seen from the perspective of “the earth”, our likeness to the material world, where 
we are special, yet most essentially of a part of it. The famous definition by Aristotle 
comes to mind, referring to the human person as a social animal (Gr. zoon politikon).8 
However, it must be realized that every attempt at describing the human being 
in such a fashion is, in fact, depreciative, for two reasons. First, the human being is 
likened to something “inferior”, less worthy, at least according to Catholic view. Sec-
ond, from this perspective, the difference between the human being and the rest of 
creation is merely relative. Using the above-cited Aristotle’s definition as the example, 
it could be argued that also animals, at least some animals, are social beings, even 
though not as much as people.9 
aspect), and as being someone irrevocably and inalienably endowed with unique dignity and potential 
(Irenaeus’ “image”—the static aspect). It is my intention, therefore, to account for the distinction between 
“being human” and “becoming human”. 
6 Ladaria, Introducción a la antropología teológica, 68. According to Ladaria, the notion of God’s image 
in the tradition did not play a greater role, and it was simply associated with the fact of the human 
being having a soul. 
7 Ibid.
8 Aristotle develops the notion of the human being as a social or political being in The Politics, where 
he argues for example that “one who is incapable of sharing or who is in need of nothing trough being 
self-sufficient is no part of city, and so is either a beast or a god (Aristotle, The Politics, 5). 
9 Damian, “The Divine Trinity as Paradigm for Ideal Human Relationships: An Orthodox Perspective”, 
63. Aristotle himself suggests the distinction between the human being and the rest of animals is 
matter of a certain convention, with humans in fact being simply more social or political than animals: 
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It seems, on the other hand, that the Bible’s intention in referring solely to 
the human being as God’s image10 is to highlight the ineradicable difference be-
tween the human kind and the rest of visible creation. Imago Dei should, therefore, 
be understood as the “essence of humanity”, that which is the crucial aspect of the 
human being, and thus the very thing that radically sets the human being apart from 
other creatures.11
Hence, there is no nobler definition of the human being than “the image of 
God.” The human person is someone bearing likeness to God, and this is where our 
essential distinction from the rest of creation rests. Naturally, it must be emphasized 
that likeness to the Creator is by no means limited to the human being. God’s traces 
or vestiges are seen in the entire work of creation. Yet, even though the Bible teaches 
that “from the greatness and beauty of created things comes a corresponding percep-
tion of their Creator” (Wis.13:5), it is the human being alone that is referred to as 
the image and likeness of God.12 The human being is, therefore, inextricably bound 
with God, as someone sharing an affinity with him/her that the rest of creation does 
not and cannot share.
God’s Image in Every Human Person
The next step is to consider whether any interpretation of imago Dei is inclusive enough 
as not to leave any human person out. Some scholars, in an attempt to systematize 
the theological thought concerning the image of God in the human being, classify all 
the existing interpretations into two types, namely: (1) Essentialist concepts, arguing 
that the human being has certain properties or traits common with God (spiritual 
qualities); and (2) relational concepts, according to which the human likeness to 
God is manifested through our social orientation, i.e., by our being oriented towards 
“the other”.13
“That man is much more a political animal than any kind of bee or any herd animal is clear” (Aristotle, 
The Politics, 4; my emphasis).
10 See Basiuk, “Człowiek—obraz Boga. Rdz 1,26-27 w kontekście Starego i Nowego Testamentu”, 52.
11 This text assumes the uniqueness of the human person compared with the rest of creation (Catholic 
Church, “Catechism of the Catholic Church” 342, 343, 356), hence the lack of consent to various 
anthropologies that hold human beings and other creatures absolutely equal or dilute the difference 
between them. This does not by any account mean that it is negating the solidarity existing between all 
creation (ibid., 344). This text, however, focus on the search for differences, not emphasizing similarities 
between creatures, hence it may seem to negate the community with other creatures.
12 Catholic Church, “Catechism of the Catholic Church” 41. 
13 Haslam, A Constructive Theology of Intellectual Disability. Human Being as Mutuality and Response, 93. 
Haslam uses a distinction originally made by Paul Ramsey. 
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Most theologians of disability are highly critical of all essentialist tendencies 
in anthropology14 and thereby also of all attempts at identifying imago Dei, i.e., 
the essence of humanity as any particular faculty or capacity,15 such as the capacity 
for knowing and loving God, or the capacity for exercising authority over the rest 
of creation. This results from the fact that people with profound intellectual disabilities 
are commonly perceived as incapable of the above.16 
Is this stance, however, valid? Perhaps it is worth changing the perspective and 
considering whether people with profound intellectual disabilities might not, in fact, 
be equipped with these capacities, as this text will shortly attempt to do.
Hence, it is the relational aspects that theologians of disability tend to focus 
on, yet this approach is bound to become problematic too, unless it assumes the 
human ability to enter a relation, and thus as long as it entirely forgoes the essentialist 
aspect. Molly Haslam’s proposition may be cited here as an example of an unsuccessful 
attempt at constructing an anthropology exclusively based on relationality. Towards 
the end of her book, she admits an essentialist element proved impossible to entirely 
avoid, as in her theory she had to assume that even though the human being has a 
relational constitution, this entails having an intrinsic ability for communication 
(hence an essentialist element is present).17
As I have indicated above, this text attempts to adopt a different method than 
those adopted by the majority of theologians of disability, who, perceiving the theo-
logical tradition (and frequently also the Church’s teaching) concerned with imago Dei 
as oppressive for people with intellectual disabilities, reject it and advocate a different 
anthropology, purportedly accommodating the reality of the people in question. 
14 Hans Reinders, for example, claims that God’s image—according to Genesis—means the uniqueness 
of the human being, but if we try to attribute it to certain faculties, we are bound to fail, as all faculties 
we possess as the human kind may—to a greater or smaller extent—also be found in animals.
15 Berinyuu, “Healing and Disability”, 203; Haslam, A Constructive Theology of Intellectual Disability. 
Human Being as Mutuality and Response, 95-99; Reinders, Receiving the Gift of Friendship: Profound 
Disability, Theological Anthropology, and Ethics, 228-231. 
16 For instance, Haslam states directly that people with intellectual disabilities are not able to know 
and love God (Haslam, A Constructive Theology of Intellectual Disability. Human Being as Mutuality and 
Response, 99). Yong, in turn, states that understanding imago Dei as human dominion over the rest of 
creation is oppressive for people with intellectual disabilities as they are incapable of having dominion 
over the world. Hence, he proposes to replace the idea of having dominion over creation with the idea 
of exercising dominion with others: people with intellectual disabilities manifest God’s image through 
their solidarity with others who directly exercise dominion over creation (Yong, Theology and Down 
Syndrome: Reimagining Disability in Late Modernity, 173).
17 Haslam, A Constructive Theology of Intellectual Disability. Human Being as Mutuality and Response, 
110-111. 
theologica xaveriana no. 188 • julio - diciembre 2019 • bogotá, colombia • issn 2011-219x 7
Whilst holding on to the traditional understanding of imago Dei, this article 
will attempt to change our perception of people with profound intellectual disabilities. 
The claims outlined below should thus remain relevant to people with intellectual 
disabilities, as well as for any other person (irrespective of their stage of life or condi-
tion), no matter how much this transcends our imagination. Let me, therefore, now 
address the following question: How can God’s image residing in every single person 
be defined, as not to exclude any member of the human family?
Human Freedom As the Image of God
It is my position that the very thing that sets the human being apart from the rest 
of the visible creation, and which is thus the essence of God’s image in the human 
person, is our capacity for either choosing or rejecting God. This, in turn, entails the 
capacity for knowing God, as it is only possible to make a choice if we know what 
we are choosing.18 
The very capacity for making a choice (freedom)19 is not a goal in itself—as it 
only facilitates the achievement of the ultimate goal that God intended for the human 
being. It allows the human person to freely choose a relationship with our Creator, 
turn to God and reciprocate the love God offers;20 and by drawing closer to God, 
18 The entire theological tradition and teaching of the Roman Catholic Church resonates with themes 
associating imago Dei with human cognitive faculties and freedom (e.g., John Paul II, “Mentally Ill 
Are Also Made in God’s Image” 3). It is a line of thinking about the image of God common to the 
most eminent Christian theologians, especially St. Agustine (Berinyuu, “Healing and Disability”, 203) 
and Saint Thomas Aquinas (Haslam, A Constructive Theology of Intellectual Disability. Human Being as 
Mutuality and Response, 96). 
19 Freedom as the freedom to choose is described in the “Catechism of the Catholic Church”: “As long 
as freedom has not bound itself definitively to its ultimate good which is God, there is the possibility 
of choosing between good and evil, and thus of growing in perfection or of failing and sinning. This 
freedom characterizes properly human acts” (Catholic Church, “Catechism of the Catholic Church” 
1732). This, however, is not the sole meaning that the word “freedom” is ascribed in the theological 
tradition or the Church’s teaching. Impossible as it is to discuss this issue in detail here, the word “freedom” 
most commonly denotes “not being enslaved by sin”, thus a situation where we do not make choices 
because we persevere in good. Thus, understood freedom amounts to achieving the ultimate goal that the 
human being is called to (John Paul II, “Encyclical Letter Veritatis Splendor” 13,17; Kempa, Konieczność 
zbawienia. Antropologiczne założenia soteriologii Anzelma z Canterbury, 168, 170). 
20 The line of thought is similar to Karl Barth’s, as invoked in Reinder’s book. Barth, drawing on Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer’s reasoning, states that God created the human being in his/her image in freedom; therefore, 
the human being, as imago Dei, is free. This human freedom is understood by Barth as freedom “for 
someone”, the freedom to be in a relation (Reinders, Receiving the Gift of Friendship: Profound Disability, 
Theological Anthropology, and Ethics, 238). It is possible to similarly interpret Saint Thomas Aquinas’ 
thought, attaching such a great importance to the intellectual nature of the human being, as it is this 
nature that allows the human beings to imitate their Creator in that which is essential: in knowing and 
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it allows the human person to resemble God. The human being is, in a way, like a 
mirror—the more he/she turns towards God and the closer he/she is to him/her, the 
better he/she reflects God’s image.21
The gift of human freedom received from the Creator is something that 
radically distinguishes us from the rest of visible creation, as opposed to e.g. intellect, 
understood as an intelligence quotient, which is not a privilege exclusive to humanity. 
After all, people with profound intellectual disabilities frequently have an intelligence 
quotient similar to, or even lower than animals. Similarly, the capacity for communi-
cation, even though it is sometimes perceived as specifically human, is also found in 
the animal world, which has its own ways of communicating, even if not as complex 
or sublime as the human language.22 
However, what radically distinguishes the human being from the rest of visible 
creation is the fact that the rest of the universe was, like the human being, created 
without its will, but, as opposed to the human kind, it will also be saved without 
its will.23 As St. Augustine put it, “God created us without us, but he did not will 
loving. According to Saint Thomas, the image of God in the human being is primarily our natural pursuit 
of knowing and loving God. Hence, in his view, the image of God in the human being is associated 
with the ability to enter a relation (Romero, “Aquinas on the corporis infirmitas: Broken Flesh and the 
Grammar of Grace”, 103; Haslam, A Constructive Theology of Intellectual Disability. Human Being as 
Mutuality and Response, 99-100). In my reasoning, I also follow the line of thinking pursued in the 
Pastoral Constitution of the Vatican Council II, Gaudium et Spes, which interprets imago Dei primarily 
as the capacity for knowing and loving God and growing in a relationship with him/her. Apart from 
these characteristics, the document lists also dominion exercised over the world (an issue that I will 
later discuss in more detail), and the social orientation of the human being, which can be understood 
as the result of our original calling to being in a relationship with the Creator (Second Vatican Council, 
“Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World Gaudium et Spes” 12; Ladaria, Introducción 
a la antropología teológica, 68). 
21 The metaphor of a mirror was used by Saint Gregory of Nyssa, who wrote that whilst the human 
being ought to reflect God, it reflects matter instead (Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, 
132). The metaphor is also found in John Calvin’s thought when he talks about the image and likeness 
of God in the human being (Haslam, A Constructive Theology of Intellectual Disability. Human Being as 
Mutuality and Response, 101).
22 Theologians of disability point out that people have a lot in common with primates. The common 
traits include e.g. empathy, altruism or social hierarchy (Yong, “The Virtues and Intellectual Disability 
Explorations in the [Cognitive] Sciences of Moral Formation”, 193). 
23 Thus, it should be stated that the divine image, understood as the freedom of choice is also attributable 
to angels, as beings who are free and capable of sin. According to Catholic Church, “Catechism of the 
Catholic Church” 311, “Angels and men, as intelligent and free creatures, have to journey toward their 
ultimate destinies by their free choice and preferential love”. St. Thomas Aquinas even claimed that 
since angels are equipped with intellect faculties superior to humans, they are a more perfect image of 
God than human beings (Haslam, A Constructive Theology of Intellectual Disability. Human Being as 
Mutuality and Response, 98).
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to save us without us.”24 The human being is thus called to freely choose being in a 
relationship with God or not.
“Relationality” As the Image of God: Human 
Relational Constitution and Calling
Not only is the human being called to be in a relationship, but also we are constituted 
by it, having been created for a relationship.25 God’s image, understood as the rela-
tionality of the human being, has been present in us since our very beginning, or, in 
fact, it is the very thing that allows us to exist at all. God calls the human being into 
existence, thus establishing a relationship which—due to God’s faithfulness—is eternal 
and unaltered, yet owing to human freedom may be broken by sin (understood in 
the most primordial way as the rejection of God), whereupon it remains a unilateral 
relationship—the relation of God to the human person. 
The human being may enter this relationship of his/her free will, just like God 
enters the relationship with the human being (creates him/her) of his/her free will. 
This is where the analogy (the likeness of the image) between God and the human 
being is rooted in. The human being is thus unlike the rest of the visible world, which 
also remains in a relation to its Creator, or rather it is God-the-Creator who remains 
in a relation to the rest of the visible world, as he/she permanently sustains the entire 
 
24 As cited in Catholic Church, “Catechism of the Catholic Church” 1847.
25 See Reinders Receiving the Gift of Friendship: Profound Disability, Theological Anthropology, 
and Ethics, 252. It is Hans Reinders approach to present us as relational beings not only through our 
very origin—having originated from someone, but also through the aim of our existence, which is 
communion, relating to others, being in relationships, not mere individualism. Bayer also develops a 
relational theology, presenting us as beings called to communication with our Creator, but also as beings 
completely dependent on God (on the relationship with God) (Bayer, “Being in the Image of God”, 77). 
Yong develops as well the interpretation of God’s image as constituted by relationship and opts for the 
relational understanding of the human being as invariably existing in relation to him/herself, others and 
God (Yong, Theology and Down Syndrome: Reimagining Disability in Late Modernity, 180-181). Even 
though Amos Yong introduces many interesting themes to the debate on God’s image in people with 
intellectual disabilities, he does not entirely support the thesis of this text, namely that (all) individuals 
with profound intellectual disabilities actively exercise freedom allowing them to voluntarily enter a 
relationship with God. Amos Yong seems to favor the position that every human being—including 
those with intellectual disabilities—is free and capable of responding to God. At the same time, however, 
he stresses the enormous diversity of people with intellectual disabilities, and the entailing varying 
degree of their individual responsibility in choosing God and salvation, to the point of suggesting that 
some such people lack such responsibility entirely (ibid., 236-239). Hence, this article does not directly 
draw from Yong’s opinions, even though many of them were the original inspiration for the author’s 
further development of this topic. 
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world in its existence (creatio continua). The human being, on the other hand, freely 
enters the relationship with and orients him/herself towards God.26
How can we, however, be assured that a given individual is in fact a human 
being, i.e., someone capable of accepting or rejecting God? If we cannot see any signs 
of his/her capacity to be in a relationship with anyone (as might be the case of people 
with profound disabilities, demented or comatose people, or fetuses27), can we still 
claim that they do, indeed, have that capacity? Can we hold on to the view that they 
are “still” or “already” (fully) human?
First and foremost, it must be pointed out that visible, noticeable abilities or 
traits should never be considered the criterion of humanity, as we are simulta neously 
spiritual and physical beings, which means that we transcend the scientifically 
measurable or verifiable. The empirical sciences may never become the sole key to 
understanding and defining the human being, as the spiritual dimension is beyond their 
reach. It is not, however, to say that certain human activities (e.g., freedom) belong 
solely to the spiritual dimension, as just the opposite is the case—each human activity 
involves or affects the entire human being. The same applies the other way round, 
since “purely bodily/physical” activities, such as eating, are permeated or affected by 
the spiritual element. A purely naturalist paradigm is not sufficient to “examine” the 
human person as a whole. 
The sole empirical criterion of humanity is being of human parentage, i.e., 
being related from humans. Being human, in turn, entails (according to the Church’s 
faith) being free to accept or reject God, and hence choose Good or evil. Thus, it is 
not that anybody becomes human with time (acquiring faculties or traits constituting 
 
26 The term “relation”/“relationship” means here “turning towards the other”, “intimacy”, “orientation 
towards”, “entering a communion”. In this sense, “relation” has positive connotations, as opposed to its 
use in psychology or colloquial language, where “toxic relationships” are often brought up. Moreover, it 
should be noted that in western Trinitarian theology “relationship” means also that which distinguishes 
the persons of the Holy Trinity from one another. The Council of Florence used this notion in its w 
Bull of union with the Copts (1442): “These three persons are one God not three gods, because there is 
one substance of the three, one essence, one nature, one Godhead, one immensity, one eternity, and 
everything is one where the difference of a relation does not prevent this.” 
27 The commonly made assumption that these categories of people are not capable of communication/
relationship with others calls for a thorough reconsideration. For instance, prenatal psychology has been 
able to demonstrate that a fetus/prenate/unborn baby is a human person from the first moments of its 
existence, not only capable of receiving and remembering various stimuli, but also of producing, sending 
them, i.e., of communication (see Chamberlain, “Babies Are Not What We Thought: Call for a New 
Paradigm”, 161-177. In regards to people with profound intellectual disabilities, their caregivers are 
known to claim that they are able to communicate with them, even though they also share their doubts 
whether perhaps this might only be their own interpretation or wishful thinking.
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their humanity), since from the very moment of our origin (i.e., conception) we are 
human, i.e., beings of human parentage. 
This is consistent with what the Book of Genesis teaches—the human being is 
human, i.e., the image of God from the very first moments of our existence, i.e., the 
moment of our creation.28 It must also be stressed that once human, a person can never 
cease being human—coming from human parents, a person retains their humanity 
eternally. According to the Church’s faith, God’s image may never be completely de-
leted or erased, i.e., the essence of humanity may not be taken away from anyone, as 
God does not take back either his/her promises or gifts.
The human being is therefore human due to being descended from human 
parents. This is a line of reasoning famously coined by one of antiquity’s most emi-
nent philosophers, Aristotle,29 yet it can also be traced in the Bible. When the New 
Testament ascertains the true humanity of Christ, it emphasizes his descent form a 
human mother. Also, Gal 4:4 refers to Christ as “born of a woman”, i.e., truly human. 
According to some scholars, this verse nears a Christological definition.30 Also, at 
28 “It would never be made human if it were not human already” (John Paul II, “Encyclical Letter 
Evangelium Vitae,” 60). John Paul II quotes at this point an excerpt from a document by the Congregation 
for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity 
of Procreation Replies to Certain Questions of the Day Donum vitae”. 
29 See Reinders, Receiving the Gift of Friendship: Profound Disability, Theological Anthropology, and Ethics, 
90. This standpoint was adopted after Aristotle by St. Thomas Aquinas (Saint Thomas Aquinas, “Summa 
Theologiae” I, q. 29, a.1.). Robert Speamann also cites a “genealogical connection with ‘the human family’” 
and states that “belonging to the human family cannot depend on empirically demonstrated properties” 
(Speamann, Persons: The Difference Between “someone” and “something”, 240). In his view, however, contrary 
to my line of argumentation, people with disabilities are in a sense ill or fall outside the norm, and he 
perceives their nature as defective. Still, he argues that they are persons (with a defective nature) and must 
be perceived as human beings. Moreover, Spearman hypothesizes that it is possible for a non-human to be 
born of a human being, and proposing certain “qualitative” criteria of being a person, he concludes that 
perhaps some animals (dolphins in particular) could be considered as persons too (Speamann, Persons: 
The Difference Between “someone” and “something”, 240-248). According to Aristotle and his followers 
(primarily Saint Thomas), people with intellectual disabilities are also perceived as “marginal cases” of 
humanity. They belong to the human kind, as human beings are defined in terms of their procreation, yet 
certain natural capacities may be manifested to a different degree in given individuals, and some capacities 
are not manifested at all in disabled people. Thus, differences between given individuals are differences 
in degree, not differences in kind. They all belong to the same human kind, as, according to this line of 
thinking: “You don’t need to be a perfect apple to be counted as an apple in the first place” (Reinders, 
Receiving the Gift of Friendship: Profound Disability, Theological Anthropology, and Ethics, 102-103). Also, 
the theologians of disability sometimes use the argument that to be a human being means to be belong 
to the human family (human kind/species—being born of human parents). See, e.g., Swinton, “What’s 
in a Name? Why People with Dementia Might Be Better Off Without the Language of Personhood”, 
245; Hedges-Goettl, “Thinking Theologically About Inclusion”, 16. 
30 Occhipinti Gozzini, “Partorito da donna”, 147. 
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the time of debates with Gnostics, Mary’s motherhood was used to validate the true 
human nature of Christ.31 Tertulian wrote: 
Else why is Christ called Man, and Son of Man, if he has nothing that is man’s, 
and nothing derived from man?—unless perchance either man is something 
other than flesh, or man’s flesh is derived from somewhere else than from man, 
or Mary is something other than human, or Marcion’s god is a man (De Carne 
Christi 5,6).32 
It must be noted, therefore, that the humanity of Jesus is not defined through 
the prism of his faculties or traits characteristic for our species (such as the fact that 
he communicates, cries, feels pain, etc.), but solely through the prism of being the 
son of Mary—since he was born of a human being, he is human. The Nicene Creed 
says: “He was born of the Virgin Mary, and became man.”
The assertion that a human being is human by simply having been born of 
human parents, prevents the exclusion from the human family of even those with the 
most severe disabilities, as, for instance, partially anencephalic neonates or fetuses with 
chromosomal aberrations. Hence, it is the most inclusive “definition” of humanity.
It can be concluded that the human being is constituted by a twofold rela-
tion—to God and to other human beings.33 Or, more accurately, that the human 
being is constituted by the special relationships held with each of the divine persons. 
As Grzegorz Strzelczyk, a Polish theologian, points out: 
Each given person is who he/she is by being in a unique relation (primarily) to 
the Triune God—the Father (being a child of God), the Son (being the image, 
a relation of brotherhood) and the Spirit (being the “dwelling place”)—and 
(secondarily) to other created persons.34 
An analogy could thus be pointed out between the relational constitution of 
human beings and the persons of the holy Trinity. Just like the Father is the Father 
because he has the Son, so is every person him/herself, in every meaning of this word, 
because he/she is descended from God and another human being.
31 Cantalamessa, “La Theotokos segno della retta fede cristologica, alla luce dei Concili di Efeso e di 
Calcedonia”, 387. 
32 Also paraphrased in: Cantalamessa, “La Theotokos segno della retta fede cristologica, alla luce dei 
Concili di Efeso e di Calcedonia”, 391.
33 Perhaps the Catholic teaching concerning human souls as immediately created by God at the moment 
of conception may be interpreted as a confirmation of a twofold human origin—from another human 
being and (immediately!) from God. See Pius XII, “Encyclical Humani Generis” 36. 
34 Strzelczyk, “Istotą, a nie tylko stopniem (LG 10). Hipoteza wyjaśnienia”, 131; Swinton, “Who is the 
God We Worship? Theologies of Disability; Challenges and New Possibilities”, 304
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Hence, the image of God is anchored in human freedom. This freedom, no-
netheless, is not a goal in itself—as its purpose is to allow the human being to enter a 
loving relationship with God—in the likeness of the second person of the holy Trinity, 
i.e., the Son; or to put it more clearly, to allow them to enter the relationship in the 
Son’s “place”. The human person finds its model in the Son,35 as our vocation is to 
become “sons in the Son.”36 The image of God—the image of the Trinity of persons 
loving each other—is present, therefore, where the human person enters a communion 
with God and other people (or in a wider perspective: with the entire creation).37 Thus, 
it is not merely a single person, but the entire human community that is imago Dei.38 
Hence, I am strongly in favor of the relational interpretation, in which God’s 
image is seen in the human being’s orientation towards another human being, their 
relationship of love with the other human being. This is grounded in the belief that 
the deepest essence of God is abiding in love—God is a Trinity of persons loving 
each other, who decides to share him/herself with the world. The human being is to 
become like God in precisely this. The human being, created in God’s image, is thus 
perfect only when he/she abides in love.39 
Human perfection or excellence does not result from is not conditioned by our 
faculties or skills, but by entering voluntarily the relationship of love.40 By loving, the 
human being becomes like God, who calls the human being to a communion with 
him/herself and other human beings, because he/she is him/herself a communion.41
35 Hence, I side with the Christological interpretation of imago Dei, which identifies being in the image 
of God with being in the image of Christ. This does not mean that human beings are the image of the 
Son alone, as the New Testament points out that the Son is the image of the Father.
36 John Paul II, “Encyclical Letter Veritatis Splendor” 18. Also see Ladaria, Introducción a la antropología 
teológica, 11. Ladaria says that the human being’s vocation is being the son of God, i.e., being in a 
relation to God that is Christ’s alone, and that this vocation entails human existence as a free being. See 
Catholic Church, “Catechism of the Catholic Church” 381. 
37 Tim Basselin also interprets the image of God as relationality modelled on the Holy Trinity, in his 
“Why theology needs disability”, 56. 
38 The likeness between the union of the divine persons, and the unity of human beings is also stated in 
Second Vatican Council, “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World Gaudium et Spes” 24.
39 Cooper, “The Disabled God”, 176; World Council of Churches, “Christian Perspectives on Theological 
Anthropology” 44.
40 World Council of Churches, “Christian Perspectives on Theological Anthropology” 44.
41 Tataryn and Truchan-Tataryn, Discovering Trinity in Disability: A Theology for Embracing Difference, 
51. It must be pointed out that the entire creation is called to a communion with God, yet the human 
being’s circumstances are radically different by the fact that we enter this communion solely by free will, 
similarly to angels, who are also free beings (Catholic Church, “Catechism of the Catholic Church” 311).
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Nonetheless, it is not the intention of this text to place in opposition the essen-
tialist and the relational aspects of human existence: God, by calling the human being 
to communion with him/herself, endows us with certain “properties” enabling us to 
enter the relationship with him/her. It is not that God first creates the human being 
endowed with certain capacities, and then calls us to a communion with him/herself 
(or the other way round), but both these acts happen at the same time.42 
Dominion over Creation As the Image of God
It is also worth examining whether the idea of the image of God, as authority or 
dominion over creation, so strongly present in the tradition and teaching of the 
Church43 does necessarily have to be seen as oppressive towards people with intellectual 
disabilities as some theologians of disability claim.44 
If we acknowledge the perspective proposed in this paper, and thus we ascertain 
the capacity of people with intellectual disabilities for either accepting or rejecting 
God, and thus for sin,45 it is also possible to acknowledge that they have authority over 
creation. The first interpretation is that since they have the capacity for rejecting God, 
they have certain authority over him/her (with which they are, naturally, endowed by 
God him/herself ), and, since they have authority over the Creator, indirectly they also 
have authority over everything that is subjected to his/her authority.
Second, and this appears to be more consistent with the message of the Bible, 
which suggests direct human domination/authority over the world, we can interpret 
“dominion over creation” in the light of St. Paul’s theology. According to St. Paul 
(Rom 8:20), and to the ensuing Christian tradition,46 human sin has affected the 
entire universe/creation. The human beings through their sin (but also through their 
holiness) have a very real, tangible influence on the course of the universe, and thus 
exercise domination over it.
42 Ladaria, Introducción a la antropología teológica, 87.
43 This understanding of imago Dei, substantiated by the Bible, especially Gen 1:28 and Sir 17:1-4, was 
consistently developed in the tradition, and due to Gerhard von Rad’s work possibly can be considered 
one of the most influential opinions of the recent times concerning God’s image in the human being 
(Ladaria, Introducción a la antropología teológica, 61; also Second Vatican Council, “Pastoral Constitution 
on the Church in the Modern World Gaudium et Spes” 12). 
44 Yong, Theology and Down Syndrome: Reimagining Disability in Late Modernity, 173. Yong proposes to 
replace it by the idea of “solidarity with others who are more actively engaged in exercising domination 
in the world”, or “the power to rule with others” (italics mine), since people with intellectual disabilities 
are incapable of exercising domination independently, on their own (ibid.) 
45 Sin is primarily an offense against God (Catholic Church, “Catechism of the Catholic Church” 1849).
46 Ibid. 400.
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Regardless of how hidden or obscure any given person’s sin or holiness are, these 
have an effect on creation. The paradigm is not exclusively moral, as human beings do 
not only have an impact on the rest of the world through their actions, their good or 
evil deeds. As we know, there is an ongoing process of matter exchange in the natural 
world, known as the cycling of the organic matter, and the human body is a part of 
this cycle. The human body receives matter, which becomes a part of its structure for 
a limited time, and is then released back into the environment. 
The human person is not, nevertheless, only body, but—using the language 
of classical theology—he/she is body and soul, perfectly united. The human body 
is, therefore, permanently pervaded with the spiritual element, and so is the matter 
that any given human being is constituted by at any given point in time. This is why 
some theologians bring up the notion of the spiritualization of matter, which occurs 
when matter enters the human body, e.g., when it is consumed.47 It would seem, 
therefore, that the spiritual condition of the person consuming the matter, which is 
then incorporated into his/her structure, is not insignificant. It could be argued that 
when returning matter to the world, a given human person in a way shares his/her own 
sinfulness, corruptness, or, conversely, his/her holiness with the surrounding world.
Similar themes regarding the effect of a given person’s holiness on the surround-
ing material world may be traced throughout the Christian tradition, the veneration of 
relics being perhaps the most prominent example. As it seems, the practice is inspired 
by the assumption that the remains of canonized saints, objects used by them, or even 
pieces of textile that have been in contact with the body of the deceased saint are in 
some special way conveyors of the person’s holiness, as if sanctified.48 Hence, even 
after body and soul are separated by death, the bodily remains of a holy person are 
still perceived as imbued with their holiness.
The use of the term of “Holy Land” to denote the geographical area where Jesus 
Christ lived is another relevant example. Perhaps, this also reflects the assumption that 
even the land touched by the feet of the world’s Savior was sanctified. The faith of the 
woman mentioned in the Gospel (Mtt 9:21), who only sought to touch the fringe of 
His coat in order to be cured, was driven by the same intuition that everything that 
surrounded Christ was imbued, filled with his sanctity and power.
47 O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer. A Christian Approach to Salvation, 255. 
48 Dziewulski, “Teologiczne podstawy kultu relikwii”, 177-178; 181. The Orthodox requirement that 
iconographers should be “spiritual people” may be considered as yet another relevant notion, perhaps 
also driven by the intuition that human spirituality has a very tangible impact on the material world 
(Klejnowski-Różycki, “Mistyka chrześcijańskiego Wchodu. Ikony”, 106, 109).
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Certainly, Jesus is a unique case of God entering, physically becoming a part of 
the material world, so that—beyond any doubt—the sanctification and redemption of 
matter is here powerful and absolute, like in no other circumstances. Nonetheless, it 
also seems certain that a through every person matter may be sanctified or redeemed.
Arguments Supporting the Thesis of Freedom of
People with Profound Intellectual Disabilities
As pointed out before, this text assumes that people with intellectual disabilities are 
capable of a free relationship with God, which entails previous knowledge of God 
(thus use of reason). This is certainly a controversial thesis and as such it warrants a 
more thorough discussion and argument, which can hardly be accommodated here 
at length. I will attempt, nonetheless, to outline the key logical and theological argu-
ments supporting this claim.
First, it should be realized that since, according to what is known from the 
revelation and the teaching of the Catholic Church, human beings are considered 
free, and people with intellectual disabilities are considered human; by the way of a 
simple syllogism it may be concluded that those people are free beings just like all 
other people. Otherwise, a double anthropology would be established (whereupon 
just some people are free whilst some are not), entailing essential inequality among 
human beings. 
This tension between the claims of human freedom and the humanity of people 
with intellectual disabilities is sometimes resolved by applying classical metaphysics 
which distinguishes between actuality (that which in fact occurs in a given being) 
and potentiality (that which is possible for a given being). It is postulated, therefore, 
that people with intellectual disabilities have a potential capacity for knowledge and 
freedom, i.e., the capacity has not developed in them, so they cannot use it, yet it is 
embedded in them as a certain potentiality.49 
However, it must be noted that according to classical metaphysics, from which 
this line of reasoning is derived, actuality is always something more perfect than 
potentiality, a fact that is very clearly demonstrated by referring to God as pure act. 
Even though people with intellectual disabilities may be, according to this reasoning, 
considered human, they remain on the margins of humanity, hence my rejection of 
 
49 Reinders, Receiving the Gift of Friendship: Profound Disability, Theological Anthropology, and Ethics, 94; 
Dettlaff, “O godności ludzi z upośledzeniem umysłowym w nauczaniu Jana Pawła II”, 303. See John Paul 
II, “Encyclical Letter Evangelium Vitae” 60. In the encyclical, this line of reasoning is applied to fetuses.
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this solution as inadequate, considering people with profound intellectual disabilities 
as individuals actively exercising use of reason and freedom. 
At this point, however, it must be clearly defined in what way human use of 
reason and freedom are understood in this text, complying with the Church’s teachings. 
The use of reason—as it was in fact understood in the entire theological tradition50 
and the Church’s teaching—has always been a term used to distinguish us, human 
beings, from the rest of visible creation. 
Thus, it can be instantly clarified what the use of reason is not. It cannot be 
understood in cognitive terms, identified with the reason of the Enlightenment period, 
or intelligence, as animals also learn about the world and have considerable intelligence 
of their own, with their IQ in some cases being even higher than that of given human 
beings. Thus, use of reason perceived in this particular way would be nothing unique 
to human beings, nothing that would set us apart from the rest of visible creation. 
Therefore, how may the human use of reason be defined?
The use of reason, according to the tradition and the teachings of the magisteri-
um may be primarily described as the capacity for knowing God51, but also—second-
arily—as knowing the world and other human beings. Such use of reason is impos-
sible to verify empirically, and even though it is possible at times to see its biological 
substrates (e.g., in the form of given biochemical changes in our brains), ultimately, 
it is impossible to prove its absence. The fact of its existence in every human being 
must be recognized a priori, without material evidence. The fact that use of reason 
thus defined may not be empirically verified becomes obvious when it is considered 
that the “object” of knowing is primarily God himself/herself. 
However, also knowing the world and other human beings, which is also exer-
cised through human use of reason, would then consist more in knowing the innate 
truth, the essence of existence, “the mystery of the world”, thus areas of reality that 
are not simply verifiable or (all the more!) simply expressed. These “hidden mysteries” 
become known more in a certain flash of enlightenment, revelation, inner realization, 
intuition or even vague premonition. 
Our conviction of the truth of knowledge acquired in such a way is equally 
powerful as that based on axioms and as a result of applying rigorously designed 
empirical methods. This is what uniquely human knowledge, i.e., human use of 
50 Saint Thomas Aquinas may serve as a representative example here. Use of reason, in Miquel Romoero’s 
opinion, is for Thomas a broad term used to distinguish human beings from animals, hence it may not 
be identifed as merely intelligence or the ability of knowing (Romero, “Aquinas on the corporis infirmitas: 
Broken Flesh and the Grammar of Grace”, 105).
51 Catholic Church, “Catechism of the Catholic Church” 356.
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reason consists in. Such knowledge is, in fact, recognized in all the human sciences 
(as opposed to natural sciences), thus in all “sciences” which examine what is human 
in an ultimately human way.52
The recognition of use of reason in people with intellectual disabilities leads us 
to the recognition of their freedom, to the recognition of them as individuals actively 
exercising their freedom. Use of reason is a prerequisite for the existence of freedom, 
as it is only prior knowledge that facilitates choice. Freedom, according to the theo-
logical tradition and the magisterium, primarily means the freedom to choose God 
and hence the freedom to choose Good or evil, God or not God. 
This means that, in the human being, there exists a free will not determined 
by anything that may either accept or reject God’s offer of love. Freedom thus enables 
us to exercise our primary calling, i.e., the calling to love and to be loved. Without 
freedom genuine love may never exist. Freedom of the human person is exercised pri-
marily in relation to God,53 in the fact that the person may come to love their Creator.
In the context of the above thesis, is it possible that the almighty God did 
endow certain people with the gift of freedom? If we understand freedom as the most 
precious and crucial of all gifts, as it allows the human being to love, we should not 
have any doubts in this respect. 
Also, by keeping in mind the truth about the impossibility of knowing God 
fully, i.e., the assumption that there is an infinite difference between God and the 
human being, so we can never fully come to know and comprehend God,54 it could 
be asked whether it matters if that difference concerns an intellectually able person 
or one with an intellectual disability. 
In both cases, the difference is so infinite, that surely our degree of intellectual 
ability is of no relevance. However, by claiming that the infinite God may communi-
cate with intellectually able people, and they have the capacity for responding to him/
her, whilst also assuming the same to be out of question for people with intellectual 
disabilities, do we not, in fact, assume the difference between individual people to be 
far greater than that between God and the human being in general? 
Erin Staley, a theologian of disability, suggests that we find it easy to draw a 
distinction between those who are fully intellectually able and those with intellectual 
disabilities, losing the sense of the actual infinite distinction, the difference between 
52 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 17-31.
53 Ladaria, Introducción a la antropología teológica, 92.
54 The Catechism informs us that “our knowledge of God is limited” (Catholic Church, “Catechism of 
the Catholic Church” 40).
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God and the human being.55 She reminds us that “the smartest human being is far 
more like a person with an intellectual disability than he or she is like God.”56 
Even though theology—according to its classical definition—is “faith seeking 
understanding”, yet it is imagination that frequently is more important when practic-
ing it than reason. Something may seem beyond our grasp simply because we fail to 
engage our imagination. In the case of people with profound intellectual disabilities, 
we find it extremely difficult to imagine what their relationship with God may be 
like, or the way they might possibly heed God’s calling.
It is just as likely and possible for God to reveal him/herself, draw close to a 
person with intellectual disabilities as to any other person in the world, even though 
it may transpire in a completely different way.57 We know that people experience God 
in various ways. Spiritual theology provides us with ample material for analysis and 
consideration in this respect. Moreover, a given person’s experience of God may be 
invisible to others and does not require outward, empirical evidence,58 and the same 
applies to this person’s free response to God. The fact that we do not see something 
does not necessarily entail that it does not exist or transpire. 
It is the very essence of faith that we believe in something that we cannot see 
(yet). Since there are so many claims that we embrace by faith alone, why should we 
not also believe that people with profound intellectual disabilities have a capacity 
for a personal relationship with God?
The Traits of God’s Image Unique to People 
with Profound Intellectual Disabilities
When discussing God’s image in the human being, we cannot stop at traits that are 
shared by, common to all people. It seems that every person individually reflects some 
particular properties of God, or reflects them in an especially conspicuous way. For 
instance, it is assumed that the image of God is revealed in human sexual diversity 
(male/female), in the sense that femininity (or rather women) and masculinity (or 
men to be more precise); both tell us something different about God, with women 
reflecting certain God’s traits more clearly than men, and vice versa. Hence, let us 
55 Staley, “Intellectual Disability and Mystical Unknowing: Contemporary Insights From Medieval 
Sources”, 398. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Harshaw, God Beyond Words: Christian Theology and the Spiritual Experiences of People with Profound 
Intellectual Disabilities, 117. 
58 Ibid.
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consider the divine properties that are in a special way reflected by people with inte-
llectual disabilities.
Theologians of disability focus on the perception of disability as an expression 
of human diversity, or in a broader perspective, diversity present in all creation. Its 
origin is in Triune God—the Trinity of equal yet distinct persons. Regardless of what 
we perceive in regards to the differences between the persons of the Trinity (accord-
ing to Western or Eastern theology), the presence of diversity within the Trinity is 
undisputable. The Christian God is a God of diversity, and unity does not entail it 
being erased.59
Even though human diversity is noticeable in many levels, including sexual 
and ethnic diversity, diversity of talents, interests, etc., the “otherness” of those with 
all kinds of disabilities is especially discernible within the human community. It is as 
if people with profound intellectual disabilities were especially conspicuous signs of 
human diversity. Their bodies and minds differ from other people’s. Their behavior 
does not conform to what is perceived as conventional. 
From the perspective of those intellectually able, they do not have certain 
fairly common skills or abilities, yet they are often equipped with other gifts, e.g., 
the ability to sense and interpret other people’s emotions. Their needs are different 
to other people’s, and they enjoy different things. They communicate their emotions 
and needs differently. Thus, they are a special sign of the diversity of God’s creation, 
rooted in the diversity within the Holy Trinity.
Another characteristic that sets apart people with disabilities, especially those 
with profound intellectual disabilities, is their complete dependence on others. Inde-
pendent existence is out of their reach, sometimes the simplest activities of daily living 
are impossible for them to manage. Frequently, they are unable to eat, move, or care 
for personal hygiene on their own. Theologians of disability underscore that by all this 
they reflect the truth about the human person as a codependent, nonautonomous, 
relational being, one with an innate need of relationships with others.60 
59 George, “Voices and Visions from the Margins on Mission and Unity: A Disability- informed Reading 
of the Pauline Metaphor of the Church as the Body of Christ”, 97. 
60 Theologians highlight both the complete dependence of all human beings on their Creator and the 
mutual dependence, while pointing out that this perspective, universal to all people, is made especially 
clear by the existence of those with disabilities (Swinton, “Who is the God We Worship? Theologies 
of Disability; Challenges and New Possibilities”, 292; 295; 296; Reynolds, “Theology and Disability: 
Changing the Conversation”, 39; 42; Swinton, Mowat and Baines, “Whose Story Am I? Redescribing 
Profound Intellectual Disability in the Kingdom of God”, 10-11; Tataryn and Truchan-Tataryn, 
Discovering Trinity in Disability: A Theology for Embracing Difference, 15; Cross, “Disability, Impairment, 
and Some Medieval Accounts of the Incarnation: Suggestions for a Theology of Personhood”, 648. 
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Their complete dependence from others may, in fact, reflect also some truth 
about God himself/herself, and in a twofold way. First and foremost, this quality may 
be ascribed to Triune God. It can be argued that the divine persons are interdepen-
dent. The Father would not be the Father if it were not for the Son; the Son would 
not be the Son, if it were not for the Father. The divine persons need one another for 
each of them to be who they are—they need the other. Therefore, the divine persons 
necessarily remain in a relation with one another.61
Second, and this is a much more tentative statement, it could be argued that 
in a very special sense God made himself/herself dependent on the human being. 
This dependence, however, is not inherent, as it is within the Holy Trinity, but it was 
established by the almighty God. God did not need creation, it was not in any way 
necessary, and yet by deciding to bring free beings into existence, and voluntarily 
limited his/her power—God cannot (does not want to) save human beings without 
their consent, forcing them love him/her. In this sense, God needs human beings, 
needs their freely given consent, even though without it he/she remains God.
When discussing the aspects of divine image unique to people with profound 
intellectual disabilities, another trait that stands out is their mysteriousness. God is 
mystery, and people with disabilities are a powerful reminder of this fact. As Jennie 
Weiss Block—one of female theologians of disability—puts it, “disability is a dramatic 
reminder that God’s ways are not our ways. God is not what we expect.”62 
Although this author seems to be emphasizing more on the aspect of God’s 
mysterious ways in respect of disability (why does God allow disability to exist in 
the first place? Why does he/she not wish to remove, do away with disabilities?), her 
statement may also be interpreted from the paradigm of the mystery of the divine 
being. God ways are mysterious because he/she is mystery.
People with profound intellectual disabilities are a mystery to us, too. We find 
it difficult or even impossible to adequately communicate with them, and frequently 
guess rather than know for a fact how and what they feel, need or require. Even though 
an experienced caregiver is able to communicate with a person with intellectual dis-
abilities, a certain level of assurance is missing. 
Obviously, also intellectually able people may have difficulties expressing their 
needs, and communication sometimes fails, but communicating with people with 
intellectual disabilities poses the biggest challenges. All human persons are a mystery 
61 Swinton, “Who is the God We Worship? Theologies of Disability; Challenges and New Possibilities”, 
297. 
62 Weiss Block, Copious Hosting: A Theology of Access for People with Disabilities, 91.
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in their own right, yet this truth is especially evident in the case of people with pro-
found intellectual disabilities.
Human mystery is rooted in divine mystery, as the human being is a 
mystery because the source of our existence, God him/herself is mystery. The 
human mystery thus reflects the mystery of God. This aspect of divine nature, the 
divine mysteriousness or incomprehensibility63 is highlighted by apophatic theology 
stressing the fact that God is in fact different than anything that we may think of him/
her. God is the other, the different. This considered, are there human beings who are 
more “other/different” than people with intellectual disabilities?
From this point of view, people with intellectual disabilities may be considered 
to particularly reflect the image of the first person of the Holy Trinity. It is the Father, 
who is the ultimate mystery, the obscure, transcendent source of everything that 
exists, the hidden pre-origin.64 This truth about the first person of the Holy Trinity 
is rendered by the imagery of an empty throne or by referring to God as “silence”. 
It is only through the Son in the Holy Spirit that we may come to know God.
People with intellectual disabilities are thus an image of God not despite their 
disabilities but because of them,65 as their unique, yet fully human condition distinctly 
reflects the truth of God as the communion of interdependent and diverse persons, 
who in his/her relation to the world always remains “the other”, remains the ultimate 
mystery.
Viewing the concept of God’s image through the lens of disability has yet anoth-
er significant advantage, according to the World Council of Churches: “Among other 
things it exposes the unconscious assumption, which pervades many of our cultures, 
that only a ‘perfect’ person can reflect fully the image of God—where ‘perfect’ means 
to be successful, attractive, young and not disabled.66” 
The divine image, however, is hardly to be found in the image of “perfection” 
propagated by the mass media. Imago Dei is present in every human being regardless 
of the disabilities and limitations of their mind or body,67 and sometimes, indeed, 
revealed through those very limitations or disabilities.
63 Obviously, it is not about denying any possibility of knowing God but about emphasizing the inadequacy 
of our knowledge that is at stake here.
64 Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse, 170; 185-186.
65 Eiesland, The Disabled God: Toward a Liberatory Theology of Disability, 100. 
66 World Council of Churches, “Christian Perspectives on Theological Anthropology” 44
67 Ibid. 45.
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